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[The people] should be lead, not driven. They 
should be stimulated and learn to express a desire 
To live more hygienically. It is the task of the 
health worker to create this desire. 
 
    -- Dr. John Lee Hydrick (1937) 
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Introduction 
 
         The Rockefeller Foundation's International Health Board‘s offer of 
medical services to the Dutch East Indies encountered both active and 
passive resistance from colonial public health authorities in Batavia. 
Initially, Dutch government physicians objected to what they called the 
Rockefeller Foundation's naive faith in education, propaganda and gentle 
persuasion in matters of public hygiene. In 1923, for example, the director of 
the Department of Public Health in the Dutch East Indies, Dr. J.J. van 
Lonkhuijzen, ridiculed the Rockefeller Foundation‘s proposal to help with 
the eradication of hookworm in Java by dismissing it as naïve and unsound 
and lacking in both ―propriety‖ and ―solidity.‖ 2 
As spokesman for the Dutch colonial medical establishment, Van 
Lonkhuijzen faulted the International Health Board for wishing to mount a 
public health campaign at the grassroots level and thus running the risk of 
disrupting the authentic customs and traditions (adat) of pristine village 
communities (desa) on the island of Java. Moreover, Dutch colonial 
healthcare providers were committed to a clinical and institutional practice 
of medicine; it seemed difficult for them to fathom what an educational 
public hygiene campaign might entail. In matters of contagious disease, 
epidemics and public sanitation, conventional medical wisdom in the Dutch 
East Indies emphasized discipline imposed from above, relying on curative 
and techno-scientific initiatives often deployed ex post facto. As the former 
director of the Public Health Service in West Java, Dr. P. Peverelli, 
reiterated in 1945, the Dutch East Indies Dienst der Volkgezondheid (Public 
Health Service) assumed that the blessings of Western medical science 
―should simply be imposed, either through courteous coercion (printah 
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haloes) or more forceful measures.‖ Minor success had been achieved in 
convincing the native population to take particular prophylactic medications 
or endure smallpox vaccinations. Peverelli implied, however, that until the 
1920‘s,  public hygiene programs in the Dutch East Indies were grounded in 
laissez-faire preventive policies that might be characterized more aptly as 
―the politics of laissez-mourir.‖3 
As a result, it took several years of negotiations before the Rockefeller 
Foundation‘s International Health Board gained a foothold on the island of 
Java, which constituted the political and demographic heartland of the Dutch 
East Indies. Once allowed to commence work in 1924, however, the 
Rockefeller Foundation public health endeavour was able to reach out to 
local communities through the intensive training of hygiene workers who 
conducted popular education with the aid of lantern slides, moving pictures, 
charts, health mobiles, pamphlets and other printed matter.
4
 Between 1924 
and 1939, under the dedicated leadership of Dr. John Lee Hydrick, a wide 
range of activities were initiated, such as voluntary communal projects to 
limit soil pollution and build latrines to contain hookworm disease, develop 
anti-malaria measures, improve water management and boil drinking water 
as regular practice to reduce the risk of cholera and improve nutrition and 
infant care, altogether designed to change behavioral patterns in matters of 
hygiene at the communal level. 
Why did officials in the Dienst der Volksgezondheid (Public Health 
Service) initially muster such resistance to the entry of the Rockefeller 
Foundation into the Netherlands East Indies? Aside from a sense of national 
pride concerning the highly professional character and scientific expertise of 
home-grown doctors trained in either the Netherlands or at the medical 
school in Batavia, a particular definition of a uniquely Dutch colonial 
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mission may also have played its part. The Netherlands‘ colonial governance 
of the Indonesian archipelago was grounded in a reverence for the 
distinctiveness of ethnic cultures and a desire to adjust Western values to 
local circumstances. Professions of respect for the autonomy of the desa and 
the authenticity of local and/or regional adat – that is, the cultural habits and 
traditions of each ethnic group in the archipelago – served as an ideological 
cornerstone of Dutch colonial policy in the Indonesian archipelago.  
Yet another basic assumption of Dutch colonial rule was that Javanese 
village life was guided by a fundamentally different economic logic. The 
Dutch economist J.H. Boeke, for instance, elaborated on this basic premise 
by formulating a cumbersome theory of economic dualism, positing that 
European colonizers in Asia superimposed – or juxtaposed – modern 
economic rationality with primitive, pre-modern production systems. Dual 
economic policymakers needed to acknowledge, therefore, that within the 
pre-modern sector of native farming communities, invoking rational 
arguments concerning efficient divisions of labor, self interest, and saving 
and planning for the future in order to maximize production or profits fell on 
deaf ears.
5
  
As a result, the public health establishment of the Dutch East Indies 
clung to a view that interfering in, or trying to alter, the hygienic 
comportment of villagers at the grassroots level was an alien, even troubling, 
phenomenon. Despite these persistent doubts regarding what was 
appropriate in administering public health – and thus a lingering suspicion of 
the Rockefeller Foundation‘s interventionist approach – John Hydrick, once 
he settled in Batavia, was allowed to display his innovative approach to 
public hygiene. Nonetheless, his notable achievements in education and 
improved sanitation habits through the training of local healthcare workers 
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(mantri) and other forms of gentle, if proactive, persuasion, assisted 
primarily by native doctors and support personnel, were not entirely able to 
escape a curious mixture of bafflement and scepticism in the minds of Dutch 
government physicians throughout his fifteen years of active service in 
colonial Java. 
6
   
 
The Contiguous and Simultaneous Model of American Public Health in the 
Philippines 
 
Quietly reverberating in the background of Dutch qualms about 
Hydrick‘s working methods in Java was the model of America‘s generous 
efforts to improve public health and education in the colonial Philippines. 
In the 20
th
 century, an entirely different picture obtained in the Philippines 
under United States colonial tutelage. America's commitment of capital in 
the Philippines was substantial. Relative to the infrastructural expenditures 
of the Dutch government in Indonesia, the U.S. administration in the 
Philippines spent, proportionally, almost three times as much on education, 
social services, and public works.
7
 After all, as soon as Americans were 
ensconced in their new position as colonial masters in the early 20
th
 
century, they went to work with indomitable optimism. While serving as 
the first U.S. Governor of the Philippines during the period 1901-1904, 
future president William Howard Taft had championed a policy of 
―benevolent assimilation.‖ After defeating Theodore Roosevelt in the 
presidential primary of 1908, President Taft justified America‘s colonial 
presence in Southeast Asia as being dedicated to the welfare of the Filipino 
people. ―We are the guardians‖ of the Filipinos, he proposed, but not for 
the purpose of improving the interests and social position of the region‘s 
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Spanish-educated elites. Instead, as custodian of the Philippines, he noted, 
America was charged with ―protecting the rights of the ignorant and 
uneducated who do not [yet] know their rights.‖8   
From the outset, the American government tried to downplay its 
official role as an imperial power and avoided the addition of a separate 
colonial department to its bureaucratic structure. Instead, for the 
administrative oversight of the Philippines, President McKinley had 
created a Bureau of Insular Affairs, which became part of the War 
Department. The Secretary of War, Elihu Root, appointed in 1899, 
envisioned America‘s mission as one that was embedded in the text and 
spirit of the U.S. Constitution. America‘s duty as a colonial power, he 
asserted, was to prepare Filipinos for their own ―self government‖ that 
needed to attain a socio-economic basis and political viability as soon as 
possible.
9
  
Accordingly, within a short period of time, U.S. colonial caretakers 
in the Philippines could boast of a lengthy list of conspicuous 
accomplishments, such as the construction of longer roads and the digging 
of better sewers than any colonial power in Asia. Immediate American 
disbursements for improved medical care enabled the Filipino population 
to double in size between 1900 and 1920. The colonial administration 
quickly established an educational system based on the American model, 
emphasizing individual skills and creativity among Filipino students. In the 
words of a sympathetic Dutch expert who wrote a comparative study of 
educational systems in the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies in 1923, 
American efforts were grounded in a curriculum that cultivated personal 
aptitude and fostered popular ―autonomy‖ by strengthening the nation‘s 
literacy rate from 20 percent to approximately 50 percent within one 
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generation.
10
 Yet, at no time did the Philippines represent either a real 
benefit or a genuine threat to the lifeblood of the American nation. 
Nonetheless, a discernible ambivalence about the nation‘s role as 
colonial master already existed during the early years of the 20
th
 century. A 
telltale sign of his political reversal concerning the wisdom of America‘s 
imperialist control of the Philippines was President Theodore Roosevelt‘s 
reference to the eventual independence of the Philippines as early as his 
State of the Union Address in 1908.
11
  Less than a decade later the 
Democratic Congressman William Atkinson Jones, after having consulted 
the Filipino politician Manuel Quezon, drafted a Congressional Act that 
bore his name. Quezon served as one of two resident-commissioners 
charged with representing the Philippines Assembly in the U.S. Congress 
in Washington D.C.; he helped to formulate the Jones Act‘s stipulation that 
independence should become a reality as soon as Filipinos could establish 
a "stable government." 
The U.S. Congress voted in favor of the Jones Act and it was signed 
into law by President Woodrow Wilson in August 1916. In doing so, the 
American political establishment had thus accepted the ephemeral 
character of the relationship between mother country and her colonial 
possession.
12
 It also fostered the loyalty and cooperation of such nationalist 
organizations as the Filipino Partido Nacionalista, because the Jones Act 
proposed a feasible timetable for future independence. However, Wilson 
had cautioned that Filipinos, in order to achieve true political autonomy, 
should first accept American tutelage so they could be taught how to 
absorb a sense of "discipline and order" that was grounded in constitutional 
law. Through the completion of an "apprenticeship of obedience" under the 
auspices of their American mentors, Filipinos would eventually learn "to 
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yield instinctively" to democratic rule.
13
 
         According to Raymond Kennedy, a professor of government at Yale 
University in the 1930's, American dominance in the Philippines 
constituted a "deviation" from the universal pattern of colonial mastery 
elsewhere in the world.
14
 Or, in the somewhat disingenuous words of a 
political scientist at Harvard University, Americans had always harbored 
an inherent distaste for the imperialist system. This so-called ―natural‖ 
abhorrence for imperialism was the reason that the United States had 
begun to nurture an independent Filipino nation soon after seizing colonial 
control.
15
 In fact, the U.S. venture in the Philippines was considered a 
―national aberration‖ by some Americans from the very beginning. ―Must 
we kill millions of people,‖ as the distinguished descendent of John Adams 
and John Quincy Adams — and the author of the much-admired 
autobiography The Education of Henry Adams — asked as early as 1898, 
―to give them the comforts of flannel petticoats and electric railways?‖16 
The United States, however, tended to cloak its imperial venture in 
Southeast Asia in altruistic overtones. In popular lore, most U.S. foreign 
incursions were presumably dedicated to bringing democracy and the 
American Dream to less fortunate people around the world.
17
  
In reality, however, Americans were just as interested in garnering 
financial profit as their colonial neighbors in the Dutch East Indies. Hence, 
it was likely that the precocious U.S. efforts to specify a chronological 
blueprint for Filipino independence resulted from a sober calculation that 
the Philippines might always constitute an economic burden rather than be 
a wellspring of material benefits for the mother country.  
 Quite predictably, the passage of the Jones Act caused consternation 
among America‘s colonizing neighbors in the Dutch East Indies. The 
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prospect of Filipino independence would remove America‘s political 
presence from the Southeast Asian region, and thus transform Japan into a 
potential threat to the Dutch East Indies. Worries about a Japanese 
expansion in a southward direction had arisen after the Japanese fleet‘s 
unprecedented display of military might during the Russian-Japanese war 
of 1904-1905.
18
 Nonetheless, despite the positive assessment of the Jones 
Act offered by the renowned Dutch legal scholar Cornelis van 
Vollenhoven and a few others, the predominant Dutch East Indies response 
was either a cavalier or a patronizing one. The conservative and 
business-minded Dutch politician Hendrik Colijn — whom the New York 
Times hailed as ―perhaps the greatest living expert in the government of 
Malay races‖ — stated in an interview published on February 14, 1916, 
that he was convinced the U.S. would not prematurely abdicate its Filipino 
responsibilities because such an action might harm the security of all 
European settlements in Asia. The subtext of his viewpoint may have been 
a belief that America would never be so foolish as to jeopardize its 
commercial interests in the rubber, oil, and tobacco industries in any of the 
colonial territories in Southeast Asia. 
The Netherlands Minister of Colonial Affairs, A.W.F. Idenburg, 
articulated a more circumspect opinion. Although he endorsed the 
American goal of using public education as a means of boosting Filipinos‘ 
positive sense of citizenship and civic duty, he worried about its ―hectic 
tempo‖ or ―frenzied pace.‖ Americans did not seem to have the patience to 
foster in each ethnic group and at every level of indigenous society the 
slow, organic growth of a civil society. He implied that the timetable for 
independence set forth by the 1916 Jones Act was impetuous — a concern 
Woodrow Wilson had also alluded to when he cautioned that Filipinos first 
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had to fulfill the requirements of a distinctly American curriculum that 
would teach them to acquiesce ―instinctively‖ to the demands of modern 
democratic citizenship. These reasonable Dutch responses, however, 
conflicted with the condescending judgments of a few Dutch colonial 
commentators in conservative circles. One Dutchman wrote that the Jones 
Act‘s passage highlighted Americans‘ fundamental lack of political 
intelligence, because they exhibited nothing but ―obstinacy‖ and a refusal 
to bear in mind the social and cultural complexities of Filipino society. 
Another Dutch critic charged that the ―dizzying speed‖ of U.S. policy in 
the Philippines did nothing but entrench an indigenous ―oligarchy‖ while 
completely failing to educate the Filipino ―masses.‖19 
If Americans were aware of these criticisms, they might have 
attributed it to Dutch people‘s obsessive attachment to, and economic 
reliance on, the wealth generated by their Southeast Asian colony. The 
prosperity of the Dutch nation was ―almost wholly dependent on the 
colonies,‖ as American diplomat Richard Tobin, who served in the United 
States Embassy in The Hague in the Netherlands, argued in 1927. As a 
corollary, Tobin wrote that the situation of the Indies was a subject of 
enormous anxiety among all sectors of Dutch society because "the loss of 
the colonial possessions might result in financial as well as political ruin‖ 
of the Netherlands. Nonetheless, he conceded that the nationalist agitation 
in British India in the late 1920's had failed to cause alarm among the 
Dutch, who were convinced that their country had governed its colonial 
empire "with more wisdom than the British and more vigor than the 
French."
20
 This wisdom and vigor, one of Tobin's colleagues in Batavia, 
Henry P. Starrett, had noted a few years earlier, resided in a form of 
government that was "paternal and therefore not in any sense democratic." 
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While these conditions had provoked dismay among educated Indonesians 
and social-democratically oriented European residents, he admitted that it 
had nevertheless served the best political and commercial interests of the 
colony. Dutch political practices had also protected the native population: 
"perhaps in no other way could these needs be so fully and completely met 
than by such an autocratic power intelligently applied."
21
 
 One of the secrets of Dutch colonial success, another American 
diplomat wrote to his superiors in Washington from Surabaya in 1924, is 
that they leave the indigenous peoples of the archipelago culturally 
unencumbered; Dutch colonial civil servants allowed the native residents 
of their districts to uphold and celebrate "their own customs or adat" as 
long as they were peaceful and did not "interfere with European 
exploitation."
22
 A New York Times journalist, Nicholas Roosevelt, who 
was a scion of yet another famous political family, concurred. In a book 
entitled The Philippines: A Treasure and a Problem, he suggested that the 
Dutch never interfered with native traditions and superstitions. The average 
American or Englishman, he claimed, had little patience with habits that 
were impractical albeit deeply rooted in the cosmology of various ethnic 
groups in either the Philippines or India. Roosevelt concluded that the 
Dutch, instead, simply ―accept and make the most of it.‖23   
According to Dutch East Indies government officials involved in 
either education or public health, the difference between Dutch  
governance in the Indonesian archipelago and colonial policies in the 
Philippines next door was not only salient but also disturbing. In terms of 
popular healthcare, American physicians engaged in a rigorous effort, as 
the medical historian Warwick Anderson has recently argued, to ―refashion 
Filipino bodies and social life, to forging an improved sanitary race out of 
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the raw material found in the Philippine barrio.‖24 In raising Filipinos‘ 
level of literacy in several decades, U.S. colonial rulers also set new 
educational standards for other Southeast Asian colonial territories. During 
his journey through Java in 1926, Dr. Harry Luman Russell, a 
representative of the Rockefeller Foundation‘s International Education 
Board, repeated in his diary a comment made by the Dutch East Indies 
Minister in charge of education, who had allegedly informed a Rockefeller 
representative that he had ―no personal animosity towards you or your 
work, but if it wasn‘t for what the damn Yankees in the Philippines have 
done, I would not have to spend so much money on schools.‖25 A few 
years earlier, a U.S. Navy officer writing an intelligence report observed 
that natives in colonial Indonesia did not appear as contented as Filipinos. 
Instead, they were subjected to a paternalistic, if benevolent despotism in 
which ―they have no real voice in their government.‖ These half-hearted 
educational efforts, according to one of his Dutch informers, were 
intentionally kept to a minimum because they were deemed unnecessary: 
―look at your own Filipinos: you only educate them to shoot them!‖ He 
observed that a few Dutchmen had honestly told him that the so-called 
preparation for native self-government would never be realized because the 
Indonesian people ―will never been capable of handling such complicated 
political tasks.‖26 
Until the outbreak of World War II, Rockefeller Foundation doctors 
– as well as a number of American journalists and scientists –  expressed 
on various occasions their amazement that, after 300 years of Dutch 
colonial rule in the Indonesian archipelago, only a ―tiny minority [of the 
indigenous population] was literate.‖27 As late as 1941, Archibald Steele 
reported in The Washington Star that a Dutch official had told him that too 
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much American education and prosperity had ―spoiled‖ Filipinos: they 
would have been a ―happier and less restless people if they had been given 
fewer of the benefits of Western civilization.‖ The gospel of the Dutch 
colonial administration, instead, was ―don‘t educate the people and they 
won‘t want things they don‘t need …  prevent the spread of subversive 
propaganda and you won‘t have unrest; exile or imprison the worst of the 
radicals and you don‘t need to fear serious revolt.‖28  
All of these invidious Dutch-American comparisons were further 
aggravated by the ―Djambi Affair‖ in 1921. The Minister of Colonial Affairs 
in The Hague, Simon de Graaf, had secretly maneuvered to keep the 
Standard Oil Company from gaining access to the newly discovered oil 
deposits in central Sumatra. This affair also added to the history of the 
Rockefeller Foundation‘s involvement in public health education in colonial 
Indonesia, which Victor Heiser described in 1936 as the Foundation‘s ―great 
contribution to Java.‖ Before our arrival, Heiser opined, Dutch colonial civil 
servants had achieved their commanding authority by learning ―the Malay 
language, the folklore, religion and customs.‖ With his customary hyperbole 
Heiser concluded in 1936, however, that because of the heroic efforts of Dr. 
John Lee Hydrick and the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation‘s 
International Health Board, the Dutch ―system of teaching has been changed 
at its roots. Where once the student [preparing to enter the colonial civil 
service] was taught to command, now he is instructed in the principles of 
persuasion.‖29  
Accordingly, the actual history of the ―Intensive Rural Hygiene 
Work‖ conducted by Dr. John Hydrick on behalf of the Rockeller 
Foundation in Java can reveal an abundance of insights. It can contribute to 
long-standing debates about the relative importance of technoscience versus 
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―environmental and nutritional conditions‖ in the improvement of living 
conditions and declining mortality rates in formerly colonized societies in 
Asia.
30
 At the same time, an exploration of this history will also yield a 
greater understanding of the nature of Dutch colonial rule and its ideological 
justifications by comparing it with American public healthcare initiatives in 
the Philippines. 
 
The Rockefeller Foundation in Dutch Colonial Java: A Concise History  
 
         On December 20, 1922, the evening edition of De Nieuwe 
Rotterdamsche Courant (NRC) featured an article entitled ―An astonishing 
fact.‖ During the interbellum, the daily NRC was a ‗liberal‘ free-trade 
newspaper in the city of Rotterdam, which had achieved not only 
widespread distribution but also a nation-wide political reach. The article, 
trying to decipher the mind set of the Minister of Colonial Affairs of the 
Netherlands, noted that the Rockefeller Foundation‘s offer to subsidize the 
medical efforts to cure hookworm disease in the Dutch colony of Surinam in 
the Dutch West Indies was declined because Minister Simon de Graaff 
considered it ―superfluous.‖ 31   
Half a year later, on the other side of the world in the Dutch East 
Indies, the Javanese physician Dr. Abdul Rivai referred to this specific 
article in an address to the Volksraad van Nederlands-Indië, which was the 
proto-parliament of the Dutch East Indies with a consultative rather than 
legislative function. During a meeting on June 28, 1923, Dr. Rivai expressed 
his personal amazement at the ―astonishing facts‖ raised in the NRC report. 
He urgently called on the Dutch East Indies government in Batavia to 
explain the decision of the Minister of Colonial Affairs in the Netherlands. 
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From his perspective, the rebuke of the Rockefeller Foundation‘s generous 
offer revealed a blatant lack of concern at the highest political level with the 
physical health of the indigenous populations of either the Dutch West 
Indies or the Dutch East Indies.  
In response, the director of the Civilian Medical Service (which would 
be renamed the Public Health Service or Dienst der Volksgezondheid  in 
1925), Dr. J.J. van Lonkhuijzen, tried to explain to Dr. Rivai and his fellow 
Volksraad members why the Minister of Colonial Affairs in The Hague had 
rejected the Rockefeller Foundation‘s gesture to assist with a hookworm 
campaign in the Dutch West Indies:  
 
The Dutch colony of Surinam is geographically 
located very closely to the United States; this may 
have made the Minister reluctant to put the 
Rockefeller Foundation to work in that region. I 
would like to add, however, that the Rockefeller 
Foundation has also asked whether it might help us 
in our struggle against hookworm disease in the 
[Dutch East] Indies. Because in this region we can 
collaborate with the Rockefeller Foundation more 
safely, we have granted our cooperation. In the 
course of this year, the Rockefeller Foundation 
will send us someone. This is a courtesy that will 
be gratefully and politely acknowledged but, as a 
matter of fact, one should not expect it to be a 
great leap forward. We have our own people here 
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and they will undoubtedly do no worse than the 
Rockefeller Foundation‘s representatives.32 
 
In the debating society that was the Volksraad, a pointed exchange 
ensued between Dr. Abdul Rivai and Dr. van Lonkhuijzen. Rivai argued that 
while the American doctors sent out by the Rockefeller Foundation might be 
no more competent than Dutch doctors, ―they are rich and we are poor.‖ Van 
Lonkhuijzen retorted, however, that a solitary but ―very generous and hard-
working‖ American doctor would not be able to bring about improvements 
in public health conditions in the Dutch East Indies. Van Lonkhuijzen 
proceeded in a more directly critical tone: 
 
[The Rockefeller Foundation] will send us one or 
two men. That is what they do in every country. 
They label it a so-called campaign of ‗education to 
public health.‘33 Mr. Rivai will have to concede, 
however, that one single man can not provide the 
impetus to eradicate hookworm disease. Moreover, 
from our perspective as down-to-earth Dutchmen, 
they pursue their work in a manner that lacks 
propriety.
34
 One can conjure up the image of a 
cavalry soldier on horseback, charging ahead to 
cure hookworm disease as if it were a hostile army. 
This does not give us Dutchmen an impression of 
solidity. Even if in America these methods might 
encourage the cooperation of the population, it will 
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not automatically mean that they will also succeed 
in the [Dutch East] Indies.
35
 
 
 In this and earlier rejoinders, Van Lonkhuijzen proceeded from the 
assumption that Americans would not be capable of sharing the typically 
Dutch reverence of adat and commitment to preserve the sanctity of the desa 
communities. Once he arrived in Java in 1924, Hydrick was assigned as his 
working field the region of Bantam in West Java, an assignment that 
suggested that Dutch public health‘s officials in Batavia may have intended 
Hydrick‘s efforts to fail because Bantam was a region notorious for its 
combative and ornery native population. In fact on July 11, 1927, Dr. John 
Lee Hydrick forwarded to the head offices of the International Health Board 
an excerpt from a letter he had received two years earlier from an official of 
the Dutch East Indies Public Health Service, Dr. A. Tuyter in Serang. 
Without translating the paragraph into English, Hydrick repeated Tuyter‘s 
comments: ―You know as well as I do that the leadership of the Department 
of Public Health greeted your arrival in the Dutch East Indies in order to 
commence your work with little enthusiasm. You were asked to begin your 
work in Bantam (West Java) because Department officials hoped – they 
were even convinced – that your project would result in total failure. This 
opinion was officially reiterated to me during my last meeting with [a senior 
member of the Public Health Service] dr. Mollinger.‖ 36 
 
 John Lee Hydrick’s Success Story Malgré Eux    
 
In his booklet entitled Intensive Rural Hygiene Work in the 
Netherlands East Indies, Hydrick chronicled the results of his arduous labors 
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in Java; without personal vanity or grandstanding, he recorded his 
achievements. His entire medical enterprise in Java was based on the 
straightforward premise that people‘s desire to live more hygienically could 
be cultivated through education, example and emulation. He wrote that ―it is 
the task of the health worker to create this desire … if the people can be 
taught that they themselves can carry out certain simple measures which will 
help them avoid one of the chronic diseases, they will learn to live more 
hygienically and thus build up their resistance to many other diseases.‖37  
Rather than relying on palliative care in the treatment of chronic or 
contagious disease, as was the practice of the Dutch medical establishment 
of colonial Indonesia  – which prompted Dutch doctor P. Peverelli to call it 
somewhat facetiously the ―politics of laissez-mourir‖ – Hydrick was a firm 
believer in gentle persuasion, which continued to provoke sub rosa doubts 
among his Dutch medical colleagues. As the Rockefeller Foundation‘s 
malaria specialist Dr. Lewis W. Hackett repeated again in his hand-written 
scribbles in a pocket-sized notebook during his travels in Sumatra and Java 
in March of 1928:  
 
Hydrick started this work while surrounded by 
skepticism and active hostility of the Public 
Health authorities, who had not approved of the 
advent of the RF. The theory was (and to a great 
extent still is) that the ignorant, indolent and 
superstitious Javanese can never be educated to 
habits of sanitary living, but that a minimum of 
sanitation might eventually be secured 
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throughout the island by compulsory 
regulations
38
 
 
Hackett continued his remarks by suggesting that the Dutch East 
Indies government had soon thereafter been shamed into providing the 
financial means ―for installation and adequate inspection‖ after Hydrick had 
practically controlled soil pollution within two years in ―a large 
demonstration area in the interior of the island through education alone, 
without compulsion.‖ Hackett wrote that thanks to Hydrick‘s energetic 
work: 
 
―over 50% of the householders constructed an 
excellent type of latrine entirely at their own 
expense and of their own volition, and were 
using these latrines and keeping them clean 
with a minimum of official inspections. The 
number of latrines constructed is increasing 
annually and new areas are being started in 
different parts of the island. I inspected these 
latrines in 3 different villages and found them 
the least offensive and most effective rural 
latrines I had ever seen. The people wanted 
them, built them, and maintained them as useful 
and valuable pieces of property. 
 
On March 26, 1928, while en route from Batavia to Singapore on 
board the steamer S.S. Melchior Treub, Hackett summarized his positive 
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impressions of the Rockefeller Foundation‘s work in Java. He recorded in 
his pocket calendar that Dutch authorities had ―frankly changed their mind‖ 
as to the value of a division of Public Health education by making Hydrick 
an official ―adviseur‖ of the department while increasing ―the budget of the 
division, which will have large commodious offices in the near future and a 
budget of 200,000 guilders.‖ He also indirectly commented on jaundiced 
Dutch perceptions of Java‘s native population, which they would have to 
alter because ―the educability of the Javanese in health habits has been 
proved in the civil hospitals of Java‖ as well as in village communities. Here 
he echoed the impressions Victor Heiser had earlier recorded in his 1915-
1916 memorandum on ―Medical Education in Java,‖ in which he asserted 
that ‖the Javanese are eager to learn and make excellent students.‖ Heiser 
lamented, therefore, that so few native doctors were being trained at the 
Medical School (Stovia) in Batavia: ―it seems a pity that a race so peaceably 
disposed, so willing and anxious to learn, and so ready to assimilate 
knowledge, should be left to its present fate.‖39 
Lewis Hackett concluded the travel diary recording his impressions of 
the Dutch East Indies with a subtle attempt at humor. He noted that ―if the 
educability of the Dutch authorities is equal to that of the Javanese people, 
this Public Health movement may lead to the development, extension and 
intensification of preventive health measures in rural populations as the basis 
of health units with local direction and support.‖ His final observation was 
that ―the Dutch are beginning to feel the pressure of public opinion and have 
greatly increased the educational programs – the health program should keep 
pace.‖40 Of course, neither Dutch East Indies‘ popular education nor public 
health provisions ―kept pace‖ with the model set by American teachers and 
doctors in the Philippines next door. However, whatever progress may be 
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discerned during the 1920‘s and the 1930‘s in public hygiene programs, a lot 
of credit was due to John Hydrick. His firm commitment to teaching Java‘s 
indigenous population about hygiene, clean water and its linkages to the 
habits of daily life rendered them healthier and, as a significant subtext, 
more productive and capable of generating greater profits for Dutch colonial 
export commodities such as coffee and tea, rubber and tobacco, or tin and 
bauxite. As the anthropologist Eric A Stein has recently argued, at the end of 
Hydrick‘s fifteen years of hard work in colonial Java, he had spawned what 
he liked to call an ―awakening‖ by nurturing a ―utopian vision of rural 
hygiene in which Javanese peasants were to actively embrace handwashing, 
toothbrushing, boiling water, sweeping yards, and whitewashing homes… 
water spigots and latrines that prevented communicable disease.‖41 
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